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PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY AND FAIR
TRIAL - A TALE OF THREE DOCTORS
By ALAN GRANT*
A.

INTRODUCTION
Samuel Holmes Sheppard, John Bodkin Adams and Henry Morgentaler
all share certain antecedents. Each was a doctor, each stood trial for a serious
criminal offence, and each had problems with aspects of pre-trial publicity.
Sheppard faced trial in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1954 and again in 1966 for the
alleged murder of his wife; Adams was accused of the murder of one of his
patients in England in 1957; and Morgentaler was indicted in Montreal both
in 1973 and 1975 for abortion. They share another similarity: each was
acquitted by a jury, although Sheppard had to wait until 1966 for his ultimate
acquittal on a re-trial12 and in Morgentaler's case the 1973 jury acquittal was
overturned on appeal.
The experiences of these three doctors living in three different jurisdictions provide an opportunity to examine the concept of pre-trial publicity and
to observe how it has been dealt with in societies which, despite sharing a
common law tradition, clearly differ in cultural terms.
B.

PRE-ARREST PUBLICITY

This aspect of the problem is best illustrated by the case of Dr. Sheppard.
His wife was bludgeoned to death in an upstairs bedroom of the Sheppard
home on July 4, 1954 in Bay Village, Ohio. The police were called and,
although Dr. Sheppard was suspected, no arrest was made. Twenty-five days
later, on July 29, still with no arrest made, the local police chief is said to
have told reporters:
Our feeling is that Sam Sheppard killed his wife even though we can't prove it.
If we had a single3 shred of solid evidence against him, I'd send the janitor out

to make the arrest.

This statement, its frankness surpassed only by its lack of diplomacy, is all
the more surprising because it was made on the eve of Dr. Sheppard's arrest
for the murder of his wife. The events which had occurred between the date
of the murder and the arrest of the accused might fairly be described as a
classic case of pre-trial publicity adverse to the accused. To recount just a few
©Copyright, 1976, Alan Grant.
* The author is an Assoc. Professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University.
I The conviction registered against him at his first trial in 1954 was set aside by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1966. See, Sheppard v. Maxwell, Warden, 384 U.S. 333.
2
R. v. Morgentaler (No. 5) (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 211 (Que.C.A.), aff'd by
(1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.).
3 J. H. Pollack, Dr. Sam (New York: Avon Books, 1975) at 16.
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of the headlines which appeared in the Cleveland Press on the appropriate
dates, is to make the case:
July
July
July
July

16: "The Finger of Suspicion"
20: "Getting Away with Murder"
21: "Isn't this Murder Worth an Inquest"
21 - later edition:
"Why No Inquest? Do it Now Dr. 'Gerber"
(An inquest was in fact ordered to commence at 9 a.m. the following
day. The inquest, which lasted three days, was televised live from a high
school gymnasium seating hundreds of people; Sheppard was examined
for five hours having been refused counsel and the proceedings ended
in a public brawl.)
July 28: "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect?"
July 30: "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?"
July 30 - afternoon edition:
"Quit Stalling - Bring Him In"
(At 10 p.m. that same evening, Dr. Samuel Holmes Sheppard was
arrested for the murder of his wife.)

It is, of course, not possible to prove a cause and effect relationship
between the allegations published in the newspaper and the manner in which
the authorities reacted, but that is not the point here. Could it be fairly said
that a Cleveland jury, exposed to such reporting at the pre-arrest stage, could
come to their task in an unbiased frame of mind and remain steadfast in remembering that the defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence unless
and until the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? The
answer, from an Anglo-Canadian perspective, would appear to be clearly in
the negative. Justice would hardly be seen to be done in such a case by simply
selecting a jury from those who claim not to have read the papers. In fact, all
but one of the jury members in the Sheppard trial had read papers or heard
broadcasts about the case, but the judge allowed himself to be satisfied with
statements from the jurors that they would not be influenced by what they
4
had read or heard.
This whole area presents a perplexing problem in the United States. On
the one hand, the 14th amendment guarantees an accused person a fair trial
under due process of law, but the 1st Amendment guarantees freedom of the
press. Insofar as pre-arrest publicity is concerned, this latter freedom seems
to have prevailed over the former. Even the U.S. Supreme Court of the 1960's,
the Warren Court, famous for its careful consideration of the rights of the
accused in criminal cases, based its decision for a re-trial in the Sheppard case
exclusively on the judge's failure to insulate the trial proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences. Thus, ".

.

. bedlam reigned at the

court house during the trial, and newsmen practically took over the whole
courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." However, on the issue of the pre-arrest publicity to which the accused
was subjected, the court held that "we cannot say that Sheppard was denied
due process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against the influence of
pre-trial publicity alone."0 In the inevitable contest between the 1st and 14th
4 Supra, note 1 at 354.
5 Id. at 355, per Justice Clark.
Old. at 354.
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Amendments in the U.S.A., effective restrictions on pre-arrest publicity seem
to be something of a lost cause; when prejudice from this cause appears likely,
all a judge can do is to order an adjournment until the adverse effects have
abated, or transfer the case to a venue unaffected by the publicity. These
alternatives are, of course, of little use in cases of massive and continuous
nation-wide publicity of a prejudicial nature.
Although the Court in the Sheppard case made no express mention of
judicial orders preventing pre-trial publicity ("gag orders") judges started
making use of them after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its judgment
in that case. Indeed, a group called The Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press has counted no less than 192 such court orders in the last decade. 7
Such orders can, of course, have no effect on pre-arrest publicity; in that
respect the 1st Amendment continues to reign supreme. But such orders are
having some effect on post-arrest publicity; the issue of their constitutionality
is currently before the U.S. Supreme Court, arising out of a sensational
multiple murder case in Nebraska. 8 The "gag" orders have been taking several
forms, including banning the reporting of the "gag" itself, preventing reporters
from printing information that they have discovered themselves, and reporting
matters that are otherwise publicly available. In Simants v. State of Nebraska,
now before the U.S. Supreme Court, a local judge, at the request of both
prosecution and defence counsel, ordered the press not to print most of the
information revealed at the preliminary hearing, despite the fact that the hearing was held in public. The position taken by the Supreme Court in this case
will clearly have a great effect upon the extent to which the 1st Amendment
right of freedom of the press is superseded, if at all, by the 14th Amendment
right to due process and fair trial. The Court is likely to be split upon just
where the proper balance of advantage should lie in such cases.9 Even if the
court rules in favour of some limitation on the freedom of the press, however,
it is unlikely to extend such limits to the area of pre-arrest publicity, possibly
because no court is expressly seized of the issue at that stage.10 At the prearrest stage, therefore, judicial decree is no substitute for self-discipline within
the communications industry.
Such self-discipline is usually practised by the communications media
in England and Canada at the pre-arrest stage. The media have developed a
convention of identifying a prospective defendant as merely "a man" or "a
woman"; a whole range of euphemisms have been developed, including the
notorious "a man is believed to be assisting the police with their inquiries."
Indeed in England there is a view that this practice may not be evidence of
self-discipline at all, since, even at the pre-arrest stage, a court can use its
contempt of court power to punish a reporter or broadcaster who, knowing
7 Time Magazine, May 3, 1976 at 46.
8 Simants v. State of Nebraska. This case was argued during May, 1976 and judgment is still reserved at the time of going to press.
9 Time Magazine, May 3, 1976 at 46-47.

"...

the questioning [of counsel represent-

ing the State of Nebraska and no less than thirty-five news organizations] indicated the
high court may be closely split on this issue."
10 As will be seen later, however, this has not been regarded as a problem by the
English courts in seeking to control the communications industry.
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or having good reason to believe that criminal proceedings are imminent,
chooses to publish matters calculated to prejudice a fair trial. This was
certainly the position taken by Lord Justice Salmon speaking for the English
Court of Appeal in 1968 in the case of R. v. Savundranayagan.11

That case arose out of the collapse of the Fire, Auto and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. in England; as a result the defendant was convicted of fraud
and sentenced to eight years imprisonment and fined £50,000. The accused
appealed (inter alia) on the ground that he did not have a fair trial because
the jury must have been affected by attacks made on him in the press, on
television and in books which concluded upon his guilt before he was even
arrested. Prior to his arrest, Mr. Savundranayagan was interviewed on television by Mr. David Frost. Speaking of this in the Court of Appeal, Lord
Justice Salmon said:
In my view the television interview with Mr. Savundranayagan was deplorable.

With no experience of television he was faced with a skilled interviewer whose
clear object was to establish his guilt before an audience of millions of people.
None of the ordinary safeguards for fairness that exist in a court of law were
observed, no doubt because they were not understood.... This court hopes that
no interview of this kind will ever again be televised. The court has no doubt that
the television authorities and all those producing and appearing in televised programmes are conscious of their public responsibility and now also of the peril in
which they all stand if any such interview were ever to be televised in the future.
Trial by television is not to be tolerated in a civilised society. (emphasis added)1 2

In spite of its recognition of the dangers inherent in such events, the
court declined to interfere with the conviction or sentence. Rather than exploring the essential criteria of "due process", the judgment seems to have
served the very clear purpose of warning the communications industry of the
contempt of court powers which exist to control even pre-arrest publicity.
It appears to have been a warning much taken to heart as no reported English

case since then records any further difficulties on this point. In the absence
of Canadian case law on this point, the equivalent position in Canada is unclear, although it would appear that Canadian judges would be likely to follow
the example of the English Court of Appeal. The American practice, which
so enshrines the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the 1st Amendment,
is such that the position taken in the Savundranayagan case would probably
be regarded as unconstitutional.
C.

PUBLICITY AFTER ARREST BUT BEFORE TRIAL
The case which best illustrates this problem area is that of Dr. John
Bodkin Adams. The duty of a jury is to try a case and render a true verdict
according to the evidence presented at trial. If this duty is to be effectively
discharged, the jury should ideally hear or see nothing about the case except
in court. In the run-of-the-mill case this is not difficult to achieve; but in the
sensational case it is virtually impossible. Thus it proved with Dr. Adams.
When a respected doctor is accused of murdering one of his elderly, wealthy
patients, that is news. It is even more newsworthy if there is the suspicion, as
11 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1761.
12 Id. at 1764-65.
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was suggested by the prosecution, that the doctor hoped to gain financially
from the death of his patient who had earlier altered her will to leave certain
property to that doctor. Six years had elapsed between the death and the trial.
In the interim a rumour-mill had been at work. In these circumstances, the
distinction between the motive as outlined by the prosecution at trial and that
which was generally understood by the public (and, one must assume, the
jury), was well put in a book about the trial:
The motive, as presented by the prosecution, is bewilderingly inadequate. Can
they be suggesting that a - sane? - man in the Doctor's circumstances would
commit murder for the chance of inheriting some silver and an ancient motor-car
ironically enough no longer mentioned in the will? Unless some sense or strength
can be infused into the motive it must become the sagging point of this unequal
web. Yet in a way the motive has already drawn sustenance from an irregular but
not secret source; it has waxed big by headlines, by printed inuendo, by items half
remembered from the preliminary hearing. There have been published rumours
of rich patients, mass poisonings, of legacy on legacy in solid sterling.... Everybody knows a bit too much and no one knows quite enough; there is a most disknowledge that cannot be admitted
turbing element in this case, extra-mural half
13
and cannot be kept out. (emphasis added)

Dr. Adams was acquitted and therefore could not claim to have been
prejudiced by the pre-trial publicity, but the potential danger to an accused
person was so widely recognized in England following this trial that a departmental committee was set up, under Lord Tucker, to consider the matter.
The committee recommended that "unless the accused has been discharged or
until the trial has ended, any report of committal proceedings should be restricted to particulars of'14the name of the accused, the charge, the decision of
the court and the like."
inIt was not until the following decade that both England and Canada
5 Although
11
recommendation.
this
to
effect
partial
troduced legislation to give
the Tucker Committee had advised against any exceptions to its "limiteddetails only" recommendation,' 6 this was not followed in either jurisdiction,
and each jurisdiction chose a different method of operation for triggering the
decision whether or not to allow pre-trial publicity. In England it is generally
unlawful to publish evidence taken at the preliminary inquiry before the trial
proper, but the defendant may insist on publication;T whereas in Canada,
publication is generally lawful but the defendant can require the justice holding8
the inquiry to direct that the evidence should not be published or broadcast.'
Furthermore, when there are multiple defendants in England, one accused can
insist on publication as a result of which the whole proceedings (including
13 S. Bedford, The Trial of Dr. Adams (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1959) at
14, 15.
14
Report of the Departmental Committee on Proceedings before Examining Justices,
(H.M.S.O.) Cmnd. 479 of 1958 (Reprinted 1965) at 24.
15 England: Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 3. Canada: Criminal Code, S.C. 1968-69,
c. 38, s. 33. (Now R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 467.)
16 Supra, note 14 at paragraphs 63-64.
17 Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 3(2).
'8 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.

C-34 (hereafter Code), s. 467(1).
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the evidence against the other accused), may be published;19 whereas in
Canada a demand by one accused for no publication will effectively prevent
reporting of all the evidence, whatever the views of the co-accused.20 In
addition to the general provisions regulating the reporting of evidence, a
special provision exists in Canada2 ' to protect from publication any alleged
admission or confession tendered in evidence at a preliminary inquiry. This
provision pre-dates the 1968-69 amendments 2 and appears to remain in force
notwithstanding s. 467 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, even in a case where
publication is not prohibited in Canada, reporting the details of an admission
or confession, or even the fact that one had been made at the preliminary inquiry, remains proscribed until after the trial. A feature of both the English and
Canadian law in this general area is the express enactment of offences, punishable on summary conviction, to deal with persons who fail to comply with
any restrictions placed upon publication of the evidence by the court hearing
the preliminary inquiry.23
The minimal nature of the statutory penalty in England, however, is such
that the common law contempt power is probably much more feared by editors
and publishers alike. That the courts in England will not resile from stinging
rebukes to prestigious newspapers, was shown by the case of R. v. Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. ex parte Attorney-General24 in 1967. In that case one Malik
was awaiting trial for an offence under the Race Relations Act, 1965 when the
Sunday Times published an article on race relations which included a photograph of Malik and a caption which included the words "Came to U.K. 1950,
took to politics after unedifying career as brothel-keeper, procurer and property racketeer." Notwithstanding the fact that this newspaper had devised an
elaborate system to avoid contempts of court and had done so successfully
for 150 years, Lord Parker, C.J. fined the newspaper £5,000. "It is not one
of the very worst cases," he said, "on the other hand, it is a serious case and
in all the circumstances the court feels that the publishers ...

must pay a con-

siderable fine."'25 Once again, as in the Savundranayagancase, one is left with
the impression that the court was addressing itself to the communications
media in general. When no respite was available to the mighty, the rest of the
media could expect little mercy in similar circumstances.
Another related issue is the question of public attendance at preliminary
inquiries. Mr. Justice Devlin, in his summing-up to the jury in the case of Dr.
Adams, commented that, in his view (apparently shared by the then Lord
Chief Justice Goddard), the committal proceedings in that case should have
10 R. v. Russell, Ex parte Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., [1968] 1 Q.B. 342; 3 All
E.R. 2695.
0 This appears to follow from the wording of s. 467(1). Obviously, this would only
arise where the evidence against the co-defendants was so inter-connected as to result in
one single committal proceeding against all of them.
21 Code, s. 470.
22 Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 455 [Now s. 4701.
23 England: Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 3(5) - £500 fine. Canada: Code, ss.
467(3) and 722 - 6 months imprisonment or $500 fine, or both.
24 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1 (Q.B.D.).
25
Id.at 5 and 6.
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been held in camera.26 This opinion no doubt reflected the fact that, at that
time, there were no restrictions on the reporting of preliminary inquiries. The
Tucker Committee thought that there were formidable objections to normal
or frequent in camera preliminary inquries.2 The then existing English law
merely stated that "[e]xamining justices shall not be obliged to sit in open
court."2 8 This was reversed by the post-Tucker legislation which required that
"examining justices shall sit in open court except where any enactment contains an express provision to the contrary and except where it appears to them
as respects the whole or any part of the committal proceedings that the ends
of justice would not be served by their sitting in open court." 29 Canadian law
seems to have favoured the holding of the preliminary inquiry in public and
the exception to this also relates to cases where "the ends of justice will be
best served" by excluding the public. 30 The policy in both England and
Canada, therefore, appears to encourage publicity in the form of the attendance in court of members of the public, but, depending upon the wishes of
a defendant, to discourage it in respect of the wider audience available through
the press and television.
Thus far this discussion has centered on the plight of an accused who is
likely to be prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. It has seen that the courts have a
battery of devices available, some aimed at alleviating the problem of a biased
jury (such as adjournment and change of venue), and others aimed at punishing the publisher and deterring others from interfering with the availability
of a fair trial for accused persons (such as statutory penalties and the contempt
of court power). But what about the case of a defendant, who seeks the widest
publicity for his case and who finds that restrictions are being placed upon
his ability to bring his fate to the attention of the general public? It is this area
of pre-trial publicity and fair trial, to which the case of Dr. Henry Morgentaler
is relevant.
Unlike Dr. Adams, and to some extent, Dr. Sheppard,31 Dr. Morgentaler
does not appear to have shrunk from publicity. Are the considerations to be
applied different when the accused invites publicity on general issues arising
from his prosecution, as opposed to when he seeks to limit the extent to which
details of his case are disseminated prior to trial?
Dr. Morgentaler was accused of conducting illegal abortions contrary
26

Supra, note 13 at 209.
Cmnd. 467 (1958), para. 30.
28
Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, s. 4(2).
29 Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 6(1).
30 Code, s. 465(1) (j). Similar provision also existed in earlier Codes, e.g., R.S.C.
1927, c. 36, s. 679(d). If the public is excluded, the record should contain both the order
and the reasons therefore: Re Armstrong and State of Wisconsin (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d)
331; [19721 3 O.R. 229.
S1The press not only inferred that Sheppard was guilty because he "stalled" the
investigation, hid behind his family and hired a prominent criminal lawyer, but denounced as "mass jury tampering" his efforts to gather evidence of community prejudice
caused by such publications. Sheppard replied with counter-attacks of his own in the
press and, to that extent, he added fuel to the flames, though not enough to preclude him
from asserting his right to a fair trial. (See, supra, note 1 at 359).
27
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to what is now s. 251(1) of the Criminal Code. It appears to have been
common ground that those abortions were conducted under hygienic conditions and appropriate medical supervision. The main contention of the prosecution was that such abortions could only be performed legally in accredited
or approved hospitals with the approval of a properly constituted therapeutic
abortion committee.52 Further common ground between the prosecution and
defence appears to have been that Dr. Morgentaler's premises were neither
accredited nor approved and no approval of a therapeutic abortion committee
had been forthcoming in respect of any of Dr. Morgentaler's numerous operations. The defence contended, however, that the operations performed by the
accused were protected from criminal liability by the common law defence of
necessity33 and by the special provision in the Criminal Code granting immunity to persons performing "reasonable" surgical operations with "reasonable care and skill," having regard to all the circumstances of the case.3 4 The
effect of the Morgentaler litigation to date has been to validate the "necessity"
defence (at least in cases where some evidence of necessity has been adduced
so that the issue may be left to the jury), but to deny the defence of "reasonable surgical operation" on the ground that s. 251 provides a comprehensive
code on the subject of abortion. 35 The focus of discussion here does not lie
in this area of substantive criminal law, however, but only in aspects of the
case which relate to pre-trial publicity.
It is not the purpose of this comment to suggest that pre-trial publicity
is a major aspect of the multi-faceted Morgentaler case. At the same time,
however, the long history of the litigation contains some significant points of
interest on this topic, not the least of which is the novelty of seeing the accused
being restrained from publication as opposed to the more commonplace situation, where the accused wishes that others be so restrained.
The events of interest here, therefore, are as follows:5 6
1) The grant of a prosecution request for an in camera hearing at the preliminary
inquiry on June 12, 1970, and the judicial discussion on October 30, 1970 of
defence claims that Code s. 465(1) (j) (which purports to allow such hearings
in camera) contravened the British North America Act 1867 and3 infringed
upon the right to a fair and public hearing under the Bill of Rights. T

32

Code, s. 251(4).
33 Made applicable in general Canadian criminal law by Code, s. 7(3).
34 Code, s. 45.
35

Morgentaler v. The Queen (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161

(S.c.C.).

86 Of related interest is the complaint by the prosecution, in its appeal of the 1975
acquittal, that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial when the defence lawyer
appeared on television and alleged "persecution of his courageous client." As this occurred during the trial, however, it is beyond the scope of a comment on pre-trial publicity. In the sense that a re-trial and other charges are pending against Morgentaler,
however, it can, of course, be regarded as publicity prior to those later proceedings.
3
7 R. v. Fauteux, ex parte Morgentaler (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 187 at 196-204. This
was an application for certiorarito quash an order of a magistrate that there was sufficient evidence on a preliminary hearing to warrant asking the accused if he had any
statement to make. It was dismissed on the grounds that there was not, at the above
stage, a judicial conclusion or determination made by the magistrate so as to make the
proceedings amendable to certiorari (Id. at 189). The comments on the in camera hearing are thus clearly obiter.
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2) The grant of bail to the accused on August 19, 1973, on conditions (inter alia)
that he must not comment publicly on the charges against him, not meet with
media reporters and not hold press conferences, and the application by the
prosecution on November 28, 1973, for the imprisonment of Dr. Morgentaler
for breach of some of these conditions.

Where the issue of an in camera hearing and the question of publicity
arose at the preliminary inquiry the transcript reveals the position of defence
counsel:
I do not ask that publicity be forbidden; on the contrary. My client would like to
be judged in public, but naturally, since there might be persons whose names might
Court
be mentioned and who would not care for publicity, I would submit to the
38
that the Court suggest to the press that names should not be mentioned.

Defence counsel requested that the record show that his client did not require
or request in camera proceedings and that the case be public subject to the
39
newspapers being instructed not to disclose any names.

Why did the prosecution seek an in camera hearing at all? It is clear that

the subsequent trials in 1973 and 1975 were held in open court, although s.
442 of the Criminal Code would have allowed the respective judges to have
held them in camera if they were of the opinion that it was "in the interest of
public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper administration of

justice" to do so. But the prosecution does not appear to have sought such
an order at trial. Clearly, different principles apply at the preliminary inquiry
as opposed to at trial; but if the prosecution's concern was the embarrassment
of the potential witnesses who had undergone abortions, this particular difficulty could have largely been overcome by reporting directions to the press
as the defence requested.

It seems more likely that, from the point of view of strategy, the prosecution sought the committal of Dr. Morgentaler with a minimum of publicity,
and since s. 476 makes the question of publicity a decision for the defence

and not the prosecution, s. 465(1) (j) was resorted to as a possible, but apparently ineffective, means of maintaining a low-visibility prosecution. This is
suggested because s. 465(1) (j) seems, by concentrating on who can remain
in court, to exclude the press. Section 465(1) (j) states:
A justice acting under this Part may order that no person other than the prosecutor, the accused and their counsel shall have access to or remain in the room
in which the inquiry is held, where it appears to him that the ends of justice will
be best served by so doing.
Section 442, however, is couched in different terms:
S. 442. The trial of an accused that is a corporation or who is or appears to be
sixteen years of age or more shall be held in open court, but where the court,
judge, justice, or magistrate, as the case may be, is of the opinion that it is in the
interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper administration
of justice to exclude all or any members of the public from the court room, he
may so order.

This latter section obviously allows some persons, e.g., the press, to be
38 Id. at 196.
39 ld. at 197.
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OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 14, No. 2

present at the court's discretion. By holding that s. 442 applies to preliminary
inquiries,40 the press can be allowed to remain in court when the rest of the
public have been excluded. This latter procedure seems to have been followed
at the Morgentaler preliminary inquiry although the precise issue of the
relevance of s. 442 to those proceedings does not seem to have arisen until
the certioraridecision was handed down. There Shorteno, J., appears to have
approved the position taken by Maybanks, I., in Re Spence41 who said that,
(for the purposes of what is now s. 442) of the Code:
[tihe preliminary hearing is, indeed, a trial, not a trial in which an accused may
be found guilty or innocent, but certainly a trial of an issue - the issue whether
or not an accused person should be called upon to stand trial in a superior court.

From a pragmatic point of view this approach has much to commend it, since
it takes the preliminary hearing out of the straitjacket of s. 465(1) (j) which
42
would otherwise be excessively restrictive if a decision to exclude were made.
On the issue of the constitutionality of in camera proceedings, Shorteno,
J., clearly took the view that nothing in the Canadian constitution would pro4
scribe such hearings and that they are not contrary to the Bill of Rights. 3
Surely he was right in supporting in camera proceedings in cases where the
subject matter of the suit would be destroyed, for example, by the disclosure
of a secret process, or of a secret document, or where the court is of the
opinion that witnesses would be hindered in, or prevented from, giving evidence by the presence of the public.44 It is difficult, therefore, to find sympathy
for the claim, made on behalf of Dr. Morgentaler, that proceedings held in
camera must be illegal in the circumstances of that case. Perhaps this is the
sort of claim which Hugesson, A.C.J., had in mind, at sentencing, when he
referred to "lack of good faith in evading the legal contest" and "recourse to
procedural devices to evade the contest." 45 Of the many exceptional issues to
which this litigation has given rise, the status of the in camera hearing can
hardly be one.
A much more contentious issue appears to be the bail restrictions on
public comment placed on Dr. Morgentaler and the prosecution's attempt to
seek committal to prison for their breach. Such restrictions appear to be both
superfluous and, in the context of the present case, irrelevant. If a court in
40
See, e.g., Maybanks, J., in Re Spence (1961), 132 C.C.C. 368; 37 C.R. 244; 37
W.W.R.
481.
41

Supra, note 37 at 201.
Since a court holding a preliminary inquiry under Part XV of the Code has
(unlike superior courts of criminal jurisdiction - Code s. 2) no inherent jurisdiction,
it must find express legislative authority for what it does. Thus, although the word "may"
appears in s. 465(1) (j) this does not imply that the official presiding at the preliminary
inquiry has any additional powers in the area of in camera proceedings (unless they can
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be found in legislation). This is the importance of the finding that s. 442, which is more
flexible, applies to preliminary inquiries. A short but useful description of the legislative
history of inherent jurisdiction can be found in, Poultney, The Criminal Courts of the
Province of Ontario and their Process, Vol. IX Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette
(1975), 192 at 201.
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Supra, note 34 at 196-204.
44
See, 13 Hals. 2nd Ed. at 751-52.
45 The Globe and Mail, August 3, 1974.
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Canada has extensive and effective powers to deal with contempt of court not
committed in its face, as appears to be the case, surely it is superfluous to add
to those powers by bail conditions. Furthermore, since the 1973 jury acquittal
was under appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal at the time the bail restrictions were imposed, comment on abortion in the media by Morgentaler was
hardly likely to sway the minds of senior judicial officers who would ultimately
have before them legal questions on criminal liability for abortion in Canada.
At the same time, however, one can hardly ask that the prosecution be prevented from trying its cases in the newspaper or television while allowing the
defendant free rein to do so. Therefore, some restrictions on Dr. Morgentaler
could be defended, e.g., discussion of the specific facts of the charges against
him. The restrictions placed upon him, however, went far in advance of that,
including a general ban on meeting reporters or holding press conferences.
This is clearly a dangerous development in a country which prides itself on
safeguarding freedom of speech and association. It is hoped that the Morgentaler case will not provide a precedent for the imposition of such restrictive
bail conditions in other cases. The courts should be careful not to protect the
purity of the trial process at the expense of other fundamental liberties; a
start might be made by imposing or enforcing no restrictions beyond those
absolutely essential to ensure a fair trial. General bans on addressing the media
are clearly objectionable on this basis. The danger is underlined by the fact
that when the prosecution sought the committal to custody of Dr. Morgentaler
in November of 1973 for breach of his bail conditions, it was on the basis of
wider restrictions against addressing a
his alleged failure to comply with the
46
public meeting and the news media.
D.

CONCLUSION

Pre-trial publicity and the right to a fair trial raise difficult problems of
balancing competing interests in society. The cases of Dr. Sheppard and Dr.
Adams show that the advantages which a free press brings to a democratic
society can have a counter-productive effect on the quality of justice available
to a particular individual. Steps must be taken to try to ensure a fair trial, and,
if not unconstitutional in the particular jurisdiction, to penalize those whose
reporting causes prejudice to accused persons. At the same time, however,
the case of Dr. Morgentaler shows that cases can arise where the defendant
seeks publicity for his case and ways must be devised to ensure that the courts
decide cases upon the facts in issue at the trial and not upon pressures created
or disseminated by the communications media. Striking a fair balance is no
mean task but it is one from which neither legislatures nor the judiciary can
resile if the advantages of both a free and a fair trial are to be enjoyed in a
given jurisdiction.
46 The Globe and Mail, November 29, 1973.

